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Equality can multiply due to the complementarity between wage determination and welfare spending.
A more equal wage distribution fuels welfare generosity via political competition. A more generous
welfare state fuels wage equality further via its support to weak groups in the labor market. Together
the two effects generate a cumulative process that adds up to an important social multiplier. We focus
on a political economic equilibrium which incorporates this mutual dependence between wage setting
and welfare spending. It explains how almost equally rich countries differ in economic and social equality
among their citizens and why countries cluster around different worlds of welfare capitalism---the
Scandinavian model, the Anglo-Saxon model and the Continental model. Using data on 18 OECD
countries over the period 1976-2002 we test the main predictions of the model and identify a sizeable
magnitude of the equality multiplier. We obtain additional support for the cumulative complementarity
between social spending and wage equality by applying another data set for the US over the period
1945-2001.
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With only half of the pre-tax wage inequality of the US, the Scandinavian countries of
Denmark, Norway and Sweden have twice as generous welfare spending as the US. This is
a stark illustration of a general pattern illustrated in Figure 1. The vertical axis measures
an index of the generosity of the welfare state and the horizontal axis measures the ratio
of the 9th decile to the 1st decile of gross hourly wage. The pattern is visible regardless
of what measures we use: Countries with smaller wage dierentials tend to have more
generous welfare spending, and visa versa1.
This pattern is also visible within single countries over time. In the US, for instance,
public social transfers were established by president president F.D Roosevelt in the land-
mark Social Security Act of 1935. The rst years after World War II social spending
increased considerably as percent of GDP. At the same time, wage inequality dropped to
the extent that Claudia Goldin and Robert Margo (1992) labeled this period the time
of the "Great Compression". During the era of president Ronald Reagan, there was a
period of considerable retrenchment in social spending. At the same time, wage inequality
surged to unprecedented levels. Figure 2 illustrates this pattern over time: Periods with
less growth in wage dierentials tend to have higher growth in welfare generosity, and vise
versa.
Below we oer two separate mechanisms with distinct causal eects that together can
explain this general pattern. One mechanism, the equality magnifying eect, runs from
the wage distribution to the determination of welfare state policies: More wage equality
leads the majority of voters to support a more generous welfare state. This positive
association resembles what Peter Lindert (2004) calls the 'Robin Hood paradox' in which
redistribution from the rich to the poor is least present where it is the most needed.2
The other mechanism, the wage equalizing eect, runs from welfare state policies to
wage determination: More generous welfare benets lead to more wage equality as weak
groups in the labor market improve their relative bargaining position, allowing them
to command a higher pay. In this way improved welfare benets compresses the wage
distribution from below.
Combining the two eects we have two mechanisms that are complementary. A more
equal wage distribution fuels welfare generosity and a more generous welfare state fuels
wage equality, stimulating further welfare generosity and further wage equality in a cu-
1In the appendix, we show that this pattern is robust to a host of dierent types of measures.
2Lindert draws attention to a more general regularity than we do: "Poverty policy within any one
polity or jurisdiction is supposed to aid the poor more, the lower the average income and the greater the
income inequality. Yet over time and space, the pattern is usually the opposite". (Lindert 2004, p 15.)
This equality-generosity puzzle runs counter to the most prominent theories of welfare spending such as
the seminal papers by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981) which all predict
that higher pre-tax inequality should be associated with a more generous welfare state.
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Note: Wage dispersion is the ratio of the 9th decile to the 1st decile of gross hourly wage. Source: mainly
OECD, see data appendix. Overall Generosity Index is an index of welfare generosity developed by Lyle
Scruggs, University of Connecticut, see data appendix. The gure shows average values in our data over
the time period 1976-2002. N=361
mulative process. This process can add up to a sizeable social multiplier.3 Our paper
provides a theoretical explanation of the mechanisms behind this equality multiplier and
an empirical assessment of its magnitude in OECD countries.
In order to do so we derive an equilibrium where the level of equality induces social
policies that again induce the level of equality. This is an example of Toqueville's (1835)
observation that "equality ...gives a certain direction to public spirit, a certain turn to
the laws, new maxims to those who govern, and particular habits to the governed"(p 3).
The political-economic equilibrium we derive is not converging across countries. On the
contrary, it is contingent on specic organizations and institutions.
We emphasize how certain policies and institutions t together and strengthen each
other. Societal arrangements therefore tend to come in dierent clusters of social and
economic characteristics. One example is "the three worlds of welfare capitalism", distin-
3Glaeser, Sacerdote and Schenkman (2003) discuss social multipliers where individual behavior de-
pends on aggregate behaviors. In our case the complementarity is between institutions of the labor
market and the welfare state.


























































1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
d9d1 ratio, Male Wages Social Transfers/GDP
 
 
Sources: Social Transfers 1945-1959, Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial edition (includes
Social insurance, public aid, health and medial programs, veterans programs, housing and other social
welfare programs, tables Bf189-195/gdp table Ca1); 1960-2001 from the OECD Lindert-Allard Data
Set (2009). d9d1 ratio, Male Wages from Goldin and Katz (2007) Figure 5: 1945-1960 Census data
(interpolation for 45-48 (from 1939), 50-58, and 60-62. CPS-March data from 1963.
guishing Northern Europe, Continental Europe, and the Anglo-Saxon countries into what
Esping Andersen (1990) labels the Social Democratic model, the Conservative model, and
the Liberal model. We explore this division further and nd that it is complementari-
ties between institutions|not the welfare states themselves|that account for the major
dierences between the three worlds.
While the complementarity of institutions may drive countries into dierent societal
models, the exact same complementarity would also tend to magnify a drift away from an
initial mode. The direction of change depends on the initial stimuli, and the magnitude of
change depends on both the size of the stimuli and of the size of the equality multiplier.
This is important as countries may dier along many dimensions such as their prehistory,
size, resources, organizations, institutions and governments. In some cases these dier-
ences may be minor, in other cases they may be large. In all cases existing structural
dierences may be enhanced via our social multiplier. Even small changes can therefore
be multiplied up via the cumulative process that we study.
In our empirical analysis we utilize the dierent experiences of OECD countries over
326 years from 1976 to 2002 in order to identify both the equality magnifying eect as
well as the wage equalizing eect, and thereby to provide an estimate of the size of the
equality multiplier. We also oer some supporting evidence by taking a closer look at the
development of welfare generosity and wage inequality in the Post-World-War-II United
States. The US is a particularly interesting example since it represents an extreme case
with high wage dispersion and low welfare generosity, but also because there seems to be
high expectations of changes arising from the new presidency of Barak Obama; changes
that may aect both inequality and welfare generosity in the US.
Our focus extends the welfare state literature by incorporating one important aspect
of the mutual dependence between markets and politics. We add the reverse linkage to the
analysis of how wage equality fuels the political demand for social insurance against loss of
income (see Iversen and Soskice, 2001, and Moene and Wallerstein, 2001). More generally,
our paper contributes to the discussion of why welfare spending is so much higher in some
countries than in others and why not all countries have an European style welfare state
(see Alesina and Glaeser 2001, 2004 for a broad political economic approach, Lindert,
2004, for a comprehensive historical overview, and Cameroon 1978 and Katzenstein 1985
for the role of openness and country size)).
Our analysis also adds to the ongoing discussion of why seemingly similar countries
sustain widely diering wage structures, in particular on the relative impact of market
forces versus institutions in explaining cross country dierences in the wage structure
(see eg. Devroye and Freeman (2001), Leuven et al. (2004), Blau and Kahn (1996),
Acemoglu (2003)), and Scheve and Stasavage (2008); and in explaining the development
of wage inequality within countries over time (see eg. Katz and Murphy (1992), Card and
DiNardo (2002), Autor et al. (2008), and Goldin and Katz (2006) for studies with focus
on the US experience).
Section 2 gives our basic argument and presents the equality multiplier. Section 3
explains the equality magnifying eect and section 4 explains the wage equalizing eect.
The empirical analysis is provided in sections 5 to 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 The basic argument
For each country j we combine two distinct mechanisms that can be associated with two
downward sloping curves between wage inequality Ij and welfare generosity Gj.
2.1 The equality magnifying curve
The equality magnifying curve captures how equality in the distribution of pre-tax wages
raises the generosity of the welfare state. It relates to the political competition over voters'
support where the interests of voters are shaped by the pre-tax distribution of wages.
4In short the mechanism can be written as
ln(Gj) = Aj   aIln(Ij) where Aj = A(zj) (1)
Here welfare generosity in country j is supposed to depend on country characteristics
Aj where zj is a vector including such things as the political orientation of the winning
party, the income level of the country, and indicators that pick up the economic risks that
voters are exposed to such as economic openness. Our main interest is related to aI > 0
capturing the equality magnifying eect.
As we discuss further in section 3 a more compressed wage distribution, for a given
mean, makes the majority of workers richer which in turn raises the political support for
a generous welfare spending on commodities and services that are normal goods for the
households. Deriving this equality magnifying eect we emphasize that protection against
risks has been more universally sought and has been more important for the expansion of
the welfare state, than pure redistribution of resources (Baldwin 1990, Barr 1992). Welfare
policies that, in addition to providing a more fair distribution, cover social demands for
which the market fails to provide, are much more likely to be both legitimate and popular.
Building on Moene and Wallerstein (2001, 2003) we focus on welfare spending as social
insurance against loss of income due to sickness, unemployment, and old age. It matters
which party wins the election, but all parties run on a program that is already adjusted
to the wage distribution.
2.2 The wage equalizing curve
The wage equalizing curve captures how the generosity of the welfare state Gj strengthens
weak group in the labor market. In short the mechanism is written as
ln(Ij) = Bj   agln(Gj) where Bj = B(yj) (2)
Here wage inequality in country j is supposed to depend on country characteristics Bj
where yj is a vector including such things as indicators of the wage setting system, union
density, and the level of income in the country (some of which may be shared with the
vector z, of course). Our main interest is related to ag > 0 capturing the wage equalizing
eect.
As we discuss further in section 4 welfare benets compresses the pre tax wage distri-
bution from below. Deriving this wage equalizing eect, we focus on a simple bargaining
framework where welfare benets raises the fall back position of particularly vulnerable
groups. They are therefore able to command a higher pay and to improve their relative
wage. The bargaining framework allows for both decentralized and more coordinated
wage setting.
52.3 Equilibrium and the equality multiplier
Combining the two curves we obtain a political economic equilibrium which incorporates
the mutual dependence between wage setting and welfare spending. While welfare spend-
ing depends on wage inequality, it also feeds back to the determination of the level of
wage inequality. The equilibrium outcome is the wage inequality and the level of welfare
spending that are consistent taking the mutual feed-backs into account. It can be reached
after a cumulative sequence of wage settlements and welfare state adjustments.
The equilibrium levels of welfare generosity and wage distribution are
ln(Gj) = m[Aj   aIBj] and ln(Ij) = m[Bj   agAj] (3)





which is greater than one whenever the system is stable, i.e. whenever aI < 1=ag.
The equilibrium levels shift with changing circumstances and there is an equality mul-
tiplier (or inequality multiplier, depending on the stimuli) m between wage setting and
welfare spending. The multiplier summarizes the feed back mechanisms between the
equality magnifying eect and the wage equalizing eect. The eects of shifts in Aj (for
instance caused by a change of the political color of government) or in Bj (for instance
caused by a change in the level of wage coordination) are then magnied by m > 1. A
rise in Aj, for instance,would lead to a total eect of
Gj
Gj = mAj on welfare generosity
and to a total eect on wage inequality of
Ij
Ij = magAj.
3 Deriving the Equality Magnifying Eect
In this section we derive and characterize the relationship ln(G) = A aIln(I), focussing
on how the political demand for protection against risk can be understood as a main
mechanism behind the emergence of modern welfare states. We consider a society with
a continuum of voters normalized to 1. They have jobs or occupations with dierent
productivity and risks of income loss. The productivity p has continuous distribution
with E(p) =  p, (throughout we use the expectation operator to indicate averages). In the
exposition the distribution of p is given, but how earnings relates to productivity vary
with wage determination systems as discussed in Section 4. There we derive how earnings
are an increasing function of the productivity p of the position. We write it w(p), where
w0(p)  0. b
63.1 Welfare generosity: Voters' preferences
The social chance that a person in position p will be on welfare benets is e(p). It reects
a combination of the risks of loosing one's income and the willingness to utilize welfare
state arrangements. Richer workers tend to be less inclined to use the welfare state partly
because they have a lower chance of job loss of a certain duration (they more easily get
a new one) and partly because they tend to rely more on self insurance. We express this
as e0(p)  0.
As above we denote by G the generosity of the welfare system. In most welfare systems
social insurance is oered on better terms for low wage earners than for high wage earners.
We incorporate this by assuming that each worker who loses his income obtains welfare
benets equal to G. This is of course a grave simplication, but one that can easily be
modied.4
The welfare benets are nanced by a constant marginal tax t on total income (wages
plus prots), E[(1   e(p))p], which we think of as representing total income per capita.
To simplify we abstract from deadweight losses. The balanced budget equation is then




The cost of welfare generosity is , measuring the impact on the tax rate of an increase
in the generosity level of welfare spending. Thus the cost of welfare generosity is low
whenever total income is high and the fraction citizens in need of support is low. Note
that 1= expresses total income per capita relative to the average fraction of citizens
without their ordinary pay.
The narrow self interests of a each citizen is expressed by an utility function with a





1  with  > 1
Since the individual risk of income loss must be considered a serious threat to the liv-
4In general, some benets are proportional to present earnings or past contributions; others are not.
We could have incorporated this by a given parameter  2 (0;1] reecting the composition of welfare
spending and the extent to which the poor are oered social insurance on better terms than the rich:
G(p) =






The benets G (the benet level to workers with the average wage) of the social insurance scheme are
distributed with a xed component common to all and a variable component that depends on past and
present contributions. The xed component is G which denes the oor of welfare benets to people with-
out income. The variable component is proportional to income relative to the mean G(1   )w(p)=Ew(p),
implying that here G(p) is the welfare benets to a worker in position p in the event of income loss. The
higher is  the more redistributive is the terms of the social insurance scheme. In the presentation we
apply the simplifying assumption that  = 1.
7ing conditions of a typical voter, we limit the discussion to cases where citizens have a
relatively high degree of risk aversion  > 1
Voters have political interests that reect their social identication with people who
have lost their income. The social preferences of voters are expressed as modied expected
utility, where the weight on being without ordinary income is enhanced by a parameter
h  1 capturing social care. Inserting c(p) = (1 t)w(p) and t = g the social preferences
of a worker in position p are
v (g;p) = (1   e(p))U ((1   G)w(p)) + e(p)hU (G) (6)
When h = 1, we have the narrow self-interested case of standard expected utility; when
h > 1 the probability e(p) is enhanced further. The extra weight e(p)(h 1) captures social
identication: A voter in position p is assumed to have a stronger social identication
with people who have lost their income, the more likely it is that he may end up on welfare
himself.
We nd his most preferred generosity of the welfare state|his ideal policy|from the














The most preferred welfare generosity G(p) by a voter in position p depends positively
on (i) his gross income w(p), (ii) his odds e=(1   e) of loosing the income, (iii) his social
care h, and (iv) society's income per capita 1= relative to the average fraction of people
without an income.
Opinion surveys in OECD countries show that high-paid wage and salary earners,
prefer lower taxes (and lower welfare benets) than low-paid wage earners. The reason is
most likely that the high-paid are less exposed to risks of income loss than the low-paid
and therefore identify less with those in need for a generous welfare state. From (7) it
follows that the most preferred welfare generosity goes to zero for voters in suciently low
risk positions (as the risk of loosing once income e(p) ! 0 implies G(p) ! 0); and that
the most preferred generosity goes to its maximum level for voters in suciently high risk
positions (as the risk of loosing once income e(p) ! 1 implies G(p) ! 1=). Hence, high
p workers tend to prefer low welfare generosity, whereas low p workers tend to prefer high
welfare generosity. To assure that this pattern is monotone as we move up the hierarchy
of positions we assume
G




8Condition (8) 5 implies that within any wage distribution voters in higher positions always
prefer lower taxes. Even though we do not apply median voter politics directly, it should
be observed that, as long as (8) holds, the voter in the median position pm is the median
voter who prefers Gm = G(pm).
Mean preserving wage compression implies higher wages in positions below the mean,
and lower wages in positions above the mean. It follows from (7) that the partial eect of a
higher wage w(p), for a given risk, is a higher welfare generosity G(p). As long as the wage
distribution is skewed with a median wage below the mean, a mean preserving compression
of wage dierentials implies a stronger support for a generous welfare spending from a
majority of voters.
More equal wages imply that voters become more similar in their welfare state de-
mands: A majority of them tend to support a higher level of welfare state generosity.
The main intuition is that the majority of voters, the high risk workers, demand better
social insurance as their income goes up holding the risks of their positions constant. As
welfare policies normally also vary with the color of the party in power, it is important to
incorporate political competition between parties that care about ideology and policies.
3.2 Welfare generosity: Political party competition
Political parties matter for welfare spending. With two parties or blocks|left and right|
that dier in their ideologies in the traditional manner, median voter results are not
directly applicable. Ideology draws the policies of each party away from the median
voter's ideal policy, while the competition to win the election draws the policies in the
direction of the ideal policy of the median voter (Whittman 1977, Roemer 2001).
The ideology of parties may be based on the interests of the parties' core groups, or
on inherited beliefs and perceptions of what constitute a good welfare society. These
preferences over policy outcomes are written as vL (G) and vR (G), where the left prefers
a high generosity and the right a low generosity.
Each party is willing to compromise somewhat on ideology in order to improve the
chances of winning the election. In the language of John Roemer (2001) each party is
reformist. It aims at maximizing the expected party utility, denoted VL for the left and
VR for the right. The expected utilities for the two parties are dened by
VL = qvL (GL) + [1   q]vL (GR) (9)
VR = [1   q]vR (GR) + qvR (GL) (10)
5The assumption is not very restrictive: at a level of income loss of 5 per cent, and with an income
security that moves half way in tandem with wage increases, i.e.  e0(p)=(1   e(p))  (1=2)w0(p)=w(p),
the assumption implies that  < 11.
9In these expressions the probability that the left wins, when it proposes GL and the right
proposes GR, is denoted q = q (GL;GR) and the probability that the right wins is (1   q).
We derive these probabilities for all relevant proposals GL and GR in an mathematical
appendix (Appendix A) applying a particular version of probabilistic voting (by Roemer
2001). In the appendix we use that each party would obtain an expected vote share
equal to 1=2 if both proposed the median's most preferred policy, G = Gm. If GL > GR,
however, voters with an interest to vote left must have v (GL;p)  v (GR;p) who thus
tend tend be low p workers with high risk and low pay.
An increase in either GL or GR (for GL > GR) makes the left party less attractive
for its marginal voters. The declining support is of the same magnitude irrespective of
whether the left party raises GL, or whether the right party raises GR (see the appendix).
All this is decisive for how much each party is willing to compromise its ideology to
improve its chance of winning the election. The trade-os involved are captured by the
rst order conditions, describing the Nash-equilibrium of the policy game:
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@GL











In equilibrium we obtain policy divergence: The left party chooses GL > Gm such that
the marginal reduction in the chance of winning the election times the gain of win-
ning [vL (GL)   vL (GR)], just equals the marginal ideological gain of running with a
policy closer to the party's ideals. The right party chooses GR < Gm such that the
marginal reduction in the chance of winning the election times the gain of winning
[vR (GR)   vR (GL)], equals the marginal ideological gain of running with a policy closer
to the party's ideals.6 When both parties deviate from the median's ideal policy, their
chances of winning may end up close to fty-fty. As we show in the appendix the
equilibrium value of q is 1=2 whenever each party's preferences are linear in G.
How does a more compressed wage distribution aect the proposals of the parties?
A mean preserving wage compression implies the median voter gets a higher wage and
his most preferred level of G goes up. In this way wage compression simply makes the
majority of the electorate more pro left in their welfare state preferences inducing both
parties to increase their promised welfare generosity. The left party can satisfy more of
its ideological preferences without reducing its chances to win the election, whereas the
right party must compromise its ideology in order to prevent lower chances of winning.
6The ideal policy of the median voter is not an equilibrium outcome since, for GR = Gm it pays
for the left to deviate from Gm by setting a higher level of GL. By so doing the marginal ideological
gain q@vL=@GL is strictly positive. By increasing the level of GL the left party's chance of winning the
election declines and @q=@GL < 0. Similarly, the right party would deviate from GR = Gm by reducing
the level of GR in the direction of the party's ideal policy.
10The discussion so far is summed up in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The equality magnifying eect:
(i) More equal wages imply that voters become more similar in their welfare state
demands: With a skewed wage distribution a mean preserving wage compression implies
that a majority of them wants a higher level of welfare state generosity.
(ii) With two competing blocks or parties the implemented generosity of welfare spend-
ing depends on whic party wins the election. More equal wages lead to higher welfare
spending contingent upon party in power.
4 Deriving the Wage Equalization Eect
In this section we derive and characterize the relationship ln(I) = B agln(G), discussed
in section 2, focussing on a stylized bargaining set-up.
Empirical work on relative wages in the US and elsewhere reveals large interrm and
inter industry wage dierentials that cannot be explained by union membership or any
other observable characteristics of the job or the workers (Krueger and Summers 1988,
Groshen 1991, Gibbons and Katz 1992). There can be unequal pay for equal work in
the labor market even without unions as the cost of lling vacancies or of training new
workers may endow workers with bargaining power. We use the simplest explanation for
such dierences where wage dierentials relate to rent sharing. Workers' share is denoted
. This parameter can be thought about as the bargaining power of the local work force
with or without union locals. We do not explicitly distinguish between cases where higher
job productivity p is caused by characteristics of the rm or of the worker.
4.1 Wage equalization: Decentralized system
To set ideas consider workers in position p who threaten with a strike or in other ways to
be less cooperative. The expected duration of the industrial action is a fraction  of the
contract period. By letting the conict be carried out the employer obtains (1   )(p  
!(p;G)) for the remaining period. Here !(p;G) is the lowest wage that the employer can
set, the implicit minimum wage, to workers who have lost a strike. Workers who fully
utilize their bargaining power would demand a wage, backed by the strike threat, that is
as high as possible, but not so high that it is in the employer's interest to turn down their
demand. Hence, the wage demand must satisfy p w(p)  (1 )(p   !(p;G)). Solving
this with equality we obtain
w(p) = p + (1   )!(p;G) (13)
11Welfare benets such as sickness pay, unemployment compensation and retirement
pensions, aect the implicit minimum wage ! that employers can set. Such benets are
particularly important to vulnerable groups with a high chance of losing their incomes.
To capture this the value of !(p;G) is simply set equal to
!(p;G) = z(p) + e(p)G (14)
where z(p) is the wage set by employers in the absence of welfare benets with z0(p)  0.
The important idea in (14) is not its additive form, but that higher welfare benets
constrain the lowest wage that employers can set, and that this eect is more important
for groups that are more likely to receive welfare benets than others. Clearly, more
generous welfare benets would benet low paid workers most as @!(p;G)=@G = e(p)
which is highest for low-productivity workers.
This is important for how wage inequality is aected by the generosity of the welfare
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[e(pH)   e(pL)I] < 0 (16)
since e(pH)  e(pL) and I > 1).
Hence, more generous welfare benets lead to wage compression as the inequality
between high and low wages declines. With low welfare benets vulnerable groups can be
weak in local wage disputes. They may have to accept that employers set a particularly
low wage as a response to meagre outside opportunities. Higher welfare benets empower
such weak groups enabling them to raise their wages relative to others.7
4.2 Wage equalization: Coordinated system
Bargaining institutions seem to have stronger inuence on relative wages than on the
functional distribution of wages and prots. In the empirical part of the paper we utilize
that the level of wage coordination tend to associated with lower wage inequality. Here
we explain how.
In so doing we proceed as if the average productivity, dened as above Ep =  p, is the
same across bargaining regimes. This is done in order to emphasize the impact on relative
wages. Higher wage equality may in fact increase rather than lower average productivity
7In addition vulnerable groups might be weak because they are unable to hold out in a conict for
very long. Also in this case welfare benets may empower them: their bargaining power  may go up as
they can tolerate a conict for a longer period when some of the expected expenditures are paid by the
welfare state.
12within a process of creative destruction of good and bad jobs: Wage compression raises the
protability of good jobs and reduces the protability of bad jobs as shown in a vintage
model by Moene and Wallerstein (1997). The potential productivity enhancing eect of
wage compression may help explain how groups with relatively high pay do not opt out
of the wage coordination.8
We dene (p) = p   w(p), and the aggregates are E(p) + Ew(p) = Ep. Clearly,
a higher welfare generosity G raises the average wage Ew(p) and lowers average prots
E(p).
Coordination in wage setting implies that some wages are taken out of local compe-
tition and placed into a system of collective decision making. This alters the structure
of who negotiates with whom. Worker employer bargains are replaced by worker worker
bargaining. Since unions adhere to fairness norms this change strengthens the bargaining
position of weak groups in the labor market. The level of wage coordination determines
the units over which such fairness norms are applied. When wages are determined at the
rm level, unions aect the distribution of wages within the rm. When wages are set at
the industry level, unions aect the distribution of wages across rms within the industry.
When wages are set at the national level, unions aect the distribution of wages across
rms, industries and occupations throughout the entire nation.
We rst consider an arrangement with coordination between unions and employers over
a bargaining unit with average productivity Ebp = ^ p where Eb indicates that averages
are taken within this bargaining unit b. Using capital letters to indicate the outcome of
coordination, wage coordination can be thought of as an arrangement with two states:
Stage A: the employers' association negotiate with the union confederation about the
average wage (the total wage bill) EbW(p) with bargaining power  on the union side and
1    on the employer side.
Stage B: the total wage bill EbW(p) is distributed between the employees via collective
union-union bargaining.
Just to form a union of workers with dierent productivity levels implies that the union
bargains on behalf of its members who in turn must have a way to distribute the total
union rent between themselves. Whether we should call stage B bargaining or arguing is
an open question.
In both stages the non-cooperative benchmark is likely to work as a fall-back position
if coordination breaks down. Thus if the union - employer negotiations in stage A breaks
down, the average non-cooperative wage Ebw(p) is the union's fall back position. If
coordination between unions breaks down, individual wages w(p) are workers' fall-back
position.
8In some cases employers' associations threaten with a lock out against high paid unions that would
like to opt out of wage coordination. In the Scandinavian countries of Sweden and Norway such lock out
threats have used several times in the last fty years.
13We incorporate all this with an expected status quo bias in the sense that there might
be delays before the non-cooperative system is in place, implying that the value of the fall
back positions is diminished by a factor  < 1. The higher is  the more labor disputes
and lost working days are expected in the case of a breakdown. We assume that workers'
bargaining power vis a vis employers is the same and equal to  in all bargaining units.
This is done for convenience and does not aect the main conclusions.
Stage A: the employers' association negotiate with the union confederation. We apply
the generalized Nash bargaining solution where the Nash product is given by
N = [Eb (p   W(p)   (p))]
1  [Eb (W(p)   w(p))]
 (17)
Soving for its maximum value we obtain the bargaining solution
EbW(p) = Ebw(p) + (1   )^ p (18)
where ^ p = Ebp and Eb[(p)+w(p)] = ^ p. To interpret (18) recall that the union confeder-
ation can guarantee itself the fall back pay-o Ebw(p)|the rst term in the expression.
The second term stems from the potential loss of ^ p associated with a possible break down
of coordination as the unions obtain their share  of the gain of no breakdown (1   )^ p.9
Stage B: the employees or unions share the rent above their fall-back position w(p)
equal to (1 ) p. We apply a simple generalization of the outcome from Nash-bargaining
solution to a case with a continuous distribution of wages, expressed by
W(p) = w(p) + (p)(1   )  p (19)
where (p) is the strength of workers in position p. The equation says that the coordinated
wage level to workers in position p is the value of the fall back position plus (p) times the
total gain to unions of not letting wage coordination break down, where Eb(p) = 1.In
union-union bargaining the eective strength (p) must be legitimate, based on acceptable
principles that can be defended publicly.
The eective strength of a union (p) is assumed to be a compromise between a
concern for equal treatment, and for rewards according to productivity: We express the
trade-o between the two principles as a weighted average:
(p) = r + (1   r)
p
^ p
with 0  r  1 (20)
9Equation (18) can also be written as EbW(p) = Ebw(p) + (1   )(^ p   Ebw(p)) which shows that
EbW(p)  Ebw(p) since ^ p  Ebw(p) from (13). Thus in our set-up wage coordination is associated with
wage moderation. In other words the generosity of the welfare state increases both the non-coordinated
and coordinated average wage, but the rise in the coordinated average wage EbW(p) is less than the rise
in the non-coordinated average wage Ebw(p).
14Clearly when r = 1 all weight is placed on the concern for similar treatment per member,
whereas when r = 0 all weight is placed on contribution as reected in local productivity.
The value of r is likely to be strictly positive since all groups|also the lowest paid|can
inict a cost on the others by not cooperating. The value of r is likely to be strictly less
than 1 since economic force easily translates into sharing power.10
By inserting (20) into (19)we obtain
W(p) = w(p) + (1   )r[^ p   p] (21)
Observe that if the strength of each union is determined only by its local productivity,
that is r = 0, wage coordination just reproduces the non-coordinated wage structure.
With some weight on equal treatment, however, wage coordination implies that jobs with
productivity less than the average, p < ^ p, obtain a wage rise, while jobs with productivity
above average, p > ^ p, obtain a wage decline. Hence, wage dierentials are compressed
both from below and above. Thus wage coordination reduces wage inequality within the
bargaining unit by lowering high wages and raising low wages.
Positions that do not belong to the bargaining unit are supposed to be remunerated
by local systems or sharing rules. This is particularly relevant for some high paid non-
union positions. We use the indicator function 1(b) which is unity if the position belongs
to bargaining unit b, and zero otherwise. Let us again consider the inequality between
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More coordination always reduces wage inequality, as long as more coordination implies
that more high productivity positions are included in the bargaining unit, raising the




(1   )r[1(b)W(pL)   W(pH)]
[W(pL)]2 < 0 (23)
On the one hand, as long as more wage coordination means that the average productivity
of positions included in the coordination goes up, the relationship between the degree of
wage coordination and the level of wage inequality is monotone and negative. On the
other hand, the tendency that particularly high paid positions are excluded from wage
coordination makes the wage distribution (more) skewed (with a median below the mean).
Finally, with wage coordination, as in the case of decentralized wage setting discussed
10As the fairness norms held by unions become more visible and pronounced the more coordinated the
wage setting system, the value of r can depend on the level of coordination. In highly coordinated wage
systems union representatives must publicly defend the relative wages they have negotiated. Thus the
pressure on equal treatment may become more severe.
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< 0 (24)
The discussion of wage compression and welfare benets is summed up in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 The wage equalizing eect:
(i) A generous welfare state lead to wage compression as the inequality between high
and low wages declines with higher welfare benets. This is the case at all levels of wage
coordination.
(ii) Wage coordination tends to compress wage dierentials over the bargaining unit|
both from below and above. While workers in jobs with above average productivity obtain
lower wages, workers in jobs with productivity below the average obtain higher wages
relative to the non-cooperative benchmark.
5 Empirical Identication
Two hurdles immediately arise when trying to uncover the casual relationships between
inequality I and generosity G in the two basic equations discussed in section 2 (and the
previous sections)
lnGj = A(zj)   aIlnIj and lnIj = B(yj)   aglnGj (25)
where the vectors of exogenous factors zj and yj may or may not overlap.
Heterogeneity across countries
The rst hurdle is the large heterogeneity across countries. Heterogeneity may arise
from cultural, geographical, historical or economic reasons, and may potentially create
signicant omitted variable biases in our estimates. In order to address the problem of
large heterogeneity across countries we include xed country eects in all of our regressions
below, i.e. country dummies in Aj = A(zj) and Bj = B(yj). In this way all time invariant
dierences across countries are swept out of the analysis, and identication is obtained
from within-country dierences only. Some variables, such as population size, vary very
little within each country, and are thus absorbed by the country xed eects.
Simultaneity
The second hurdle is the simultaneity problem. Our two propositions suggest that wage
inequality has an eect on welfare generosity, and that welfare generosity has an eect
16on wage inequality. Since the causality between Ij and Gj runs both ways the major
empirical challenge is to identify the basic parameters of the two equations aI and ag: We
need some exogenous factors that are included in yj and thus aect wage inequality, but
do not aect welfare generosity; and some exogenous factors that are included in zj and
thus aect welfare generosity, but do not aect wage inequality. Our theoretical model
suggests that the political color of the government should aect welfare generosity, but
not wage inequality, and that the level of wage coordination should aect wage inequality,
but not welfare generosity. We use these restrictions to identify the the slopes of the two
curves.
Instruments
In our generosity equation we use bargaining coordination as well the share of workers in-
volved in conict, labeled bargaining institutions in the following, as instruments for wage
inequality. In addition we include the share of tertiary education and the employment
rate in the 16-64 population, labeled workforce composition in the following, as another
instrument for wage inequality. The identifying assumption is that bargaining institutions
and workforce composition do not inuence generosity, conditional on the other variables
in the generosity equation (including wage inequality and country xed eects). These
assumptions are supported by the data: Our preferred models pass over-identication
tests with a good margin, and neither of our instruments contributes signicantly to the
generosity equation when entered one by one.
In our wage inequality equation we use right wing government, measured as the average
number of the last ve years that right wing parties had majority in the government as
instrument for generosity. This is consistent with our theoretical model that emphasizes
how political parties may have an independent inuence on generosity. It also turns out
that there is a signicant trend in generosity, but not in wage inequality, and thus a
trend is included among the instruments. The identifying assumption is that politics and
the trend do not have an independent eect on wage inequality, conditional on the other
variables in the wage inequality equation. From our model, the outcome of bargaining
is determined by relative outside options, bargaining power and the gains to be shared.
These factors are accounted for by such variables like union density, the generosity of the
welfare state, and GDP per capita. These assumptions are also supported by our data.
The instruments have a signicant and suciently strong impact on the instrumented
variables. Furthermore, we provide robustness tests below showing that our results do
not rely on one specic instrument (for instance the trend term in the generosity equation),
consistent with our tests of over-identication.
17Thatcher, Ghent and the union lobby
There are examples that seemingly go against the assumption that government does not
aect wage inequality. The Thatcher government, for instance, clearly aected wage
inequality in the UK. The way it did this, however, does not contradict our assumptions
as the government changed the regulations of how unions could operate and how they
could recruit members (see eg. Brown et al 2008). The eect on wage inequality is
therefore indirect through changes in bargaining system and in union density, variables
that we do include in the vector yj.
Another example is the recent policy changes in Sweden where the right wing govern-
ment is eectively dismantling the so called Ghent system of unemployment compensation
in which unions administer funds for unemployment insurance that are subsidized by the
government. Several studies show that union density is higher in countries with the Ghent
system (Lesh 2004, Holmlund and Lundberg 1999, and Bckerman and Uusitalo, 2005).
Again the way the government aects wage inequality|recently rst in Finland in the
1990s and maybe now in Sweden|does not contradict our assumptions as the potential
eect on wage inequality go indirectly through changes in union density, which again is
included in the vector yj.
There are also examples that seemingly go against the assumption that coordination
of unions and employer associations do not aect welfare spending. There are lobbying
eorts for specic welfare state policies both from union confederations and employer
associations. Comprehensive unions are for instance sometimes seen as strong defenders
of the welfare state. Their impact on welfare policies, however, are strongest when they
lobby for the interests of the majority of the electorate. When they lobby for more special
interests, the problem is credible threats and credible promises.
Both GDP per capita and openness appear to have a signicant inuence on both
outcomes, and are thus included as exogenous variables in both equations. We have
also included union density and the share of elderly in the population in both equations,
basically because they turned out to violate overidentication tests once included only in
one of the equations. The inclusion of these variables should of course be borne in mind
when interpreting the trend variable.
5.1 Data
We use a panel of observations of 18 OECD countries to test key predictions from the
model and to quantify the size of the equality multiplier. Our main results are obtained
using 356 observations of yearcountry cells from the period of 1976-2002. Wage inequality
is measured by the ratio of the 9th decile and the 1st decile of gross hourly earnings. This
measure is gross of taxes and transfers, and based on individual outcomes in the labor
market. Most of the observations of wage inequality are obtained from d9d1 ratios from
18OECD's Earnings Database 11.
Table 10 in the appendix shows for each country 5-years averages of wage inequality.
We nd large dierences in pre-tax wage inequality across countries. Not surprisingly,
the wage ratio is highest in the United States: In 2005, the 9th decile earner in the US
made 4.9 times the earnings of the 1st decile earner. On the other end of the scale, we
nd Norway where in the same year the 9th decile earner made 2.2 times the earning of
the 1st decile earner. Using Esping Andersen's (1990) country classication of the Three
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, we nd an average level of 3.3 for the Liberal countries,
3.1 for the Conservative countries, while the Social Democratic group of countries have
an average of 2.3. We also nd large dierences in the time pattern experienced by the
dierent countries. Out of the 26 countries listed here, 15 have experienced an increase in
wage inequality from the rst to the last of the observed 5-year periods while 11 countries
have experienced a decline in wage inequality.
Generosity of the welfare state is measured by the overall generosity index provided in
the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset, constructed and generously made avail-
able for other researchers by Lyle Scruggs at the University of Connecticut. The index
captures the generosity of income support in the case of illness, in the case of unemploy-
ment and in case of disability (including old age) of each country year cell. The generosity
index is constructed using both the replacement ratio, coverage, entitlements and tim-
ing of dierent schemes. Detailed descriptions of the data are provided in the appendix.
Again we nd considerable dierences across countries. In 2002 the index takes the value
of 35.7 for Sweden and only 18.6 for Switzerland. Averaging the overall generosity index
across the country groups of the Three Worlds of Capitalism gives 21.0 for the Liberal
countries, 28.4 for the conservative countries and 37.4 for the Social Democratic countries.
Many studies use public spending as a measure of welfare generosity. In Figure 6 in
the appendix displays the trend in both the generosity index (solid line) and in public
social expenditures as reported by the OECD (scatterplot). Public spending is a mea-
sure of outlays associated with any given level of generosity, while the overall generosity
index measures the generosity of the system, as reected in the rules concerning replace-
ment rates, coverage, entitlements, and timing. While spending varies with economic
conditions, such as the business cycle, the generosity index varies only as the rules of
the system change. We nd, for instance, that both Sweden and Finland experienced
a dramatic growth in public spending during the economic downturn the two countries
experienced during the early 1990's, while at the same time the generosity index is on a
steady decline, reecting a tightening of the rules of the welfare system.
Key variables to provide independent variation in welfare spending are indicators of
11In all regressions below, a variable indicating data source as well as dummy variables indicating
annual versus hourly earnings, and net versus gross earnings, are included when appropriate. See data
appendix for details.
19right versus left wing power in government, obtained from E. Huber et. al. (2004),
Comparative Welfare States Dataset and from Armingeon et. al. (2007) Comparative
Political Data Set. Key variables to provide independent variation in wage inequality
are indicators of bargaining systems such as bargaining coordination and the percent of
workers involved in conicts, obtained from the Golden, Miriam; Peter Lange; and Michael
Wallerstein data set (see Golden et al, 2006) and Armingeon et al (2007) respectively.
Remaining explanatory variables, such as union density, openness, GDP per capita, the
share of elderly in the population, the share of the population with tertiary education and
the employment rate of the 16-64 population are detailed in the appendix.
We also provide supplementary evidence by taking a closer look at the last half a
century of experience in the US, using a separate data set. The sources of these data are
described in detail in the appendix.
6 Results
Table 1 provides the results from three stage least square (3SLS) estimations of both the
generosity and inequality. Each equation includes xed country eects, and the variables
not included in one of the equations serve as instruments in the other equation. Year
dummies are included in the second set of equations, but not in the rst set. We nd the
year dummies to be insignicant in both equations, and thus prefer the rst set.
6.1 Estimating the Equality Magnifying Eect
The rst key prediction of our model is that more equal wages lead to higher welfare
spending (Proposition 1). The rst column of table 1 conrms this prediction empirically.
The elasticity of welfare generosity with respect to wage dispersion is -.64. This eect
is both statistically and economically signicant. We also nd that welfare generosity
is lower when right government is in power; 5 years of right wing government implies
a 2.6 percent reduction in welfare generosity. This eect is statistically signicant, but
not very large. Furthermore we nd that welfare generosity increases with income (GDP
per capita), decreases with openness and union density12, and that there seems to be a
downward trend in welfare generosity over time, conditional on income.
Welfare generosity is instrumented by both bargaining indicators; coordination and
workers in conict, and by workforce composition measures; tertiary attainment and
employment ratio of the working population. Of course, the results depend heavily on the
quality of the instruments. We thus investigate statistics from the second stage in some
detail. Table 2 shows several specications of the generosity equation, beginning with an
12The eect of openness and union density has the opposite sign in specications without xed country
eects. The long run relationships between both openness and union density and welfare generosity are
positive, but the transitory eect appears to be negative.
20Table 1: Welfare Generosity and Wage Inequality
3SLS FE 3SLS FE+Year
Generosity Inequality Generosity Inequality
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Inequality {.6412*** {.5403***
- ln(Wage Disp.) (.1251) (.1290)
Generosity {.5324*** {.5552***
- ln(Gen.Index) (.0744) (.1673)
Trend {.0196*** {.0245***
(.0029) (.0042)
Right cab. [0,1] {.0264** {.0368**
(.0083) (.0119)
ln GDP per cap. .4464*** .1642*** .5202*** .1321
(.0387) (.0204) (.0602) (.1134)
Openness (pct GDP) {.0037*** {.0043*** {.0032** {.0047***
(.0011) (.0010) (.0012) (.0010)
Share 65+ pct .0071 {.0084** .0105* {.0091*
(.0046) (.0030) (.0047) (.0039)
Union Density {.0024** {.0010 {.0026** {.0013
(.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008)
Barg. Coordination {.0208** {.0178**
(.0065) (.0069)
Conict (pct) .0015*** .0014**
(.0003) (.0006)
Tertiary (pct pop) {.0021* {.0010
(.0009) (.0012)
Empl.pct. 16-64 .0024*** .0031***
(.0006) (.0007)
Constant {.7411 1.4466*** {1.6799* 1.7266**
(.5218) (.1911) (.7116) (.6550)
Country xed eects Y Y Y Y
Year xed eects Y Y
P-value years .2747 .9830
No. of cases 356 356 356 356
Number of countries: 18. 3 stage least square estimations. Dependent variables: ln(Overall
Generosity Index) and ln(Wage dispersion). Instruments for wage inequality are Bargaining
coordination, Workers in conict, Share of pop. with tertiary education and the employment
pct(16-64). Instruments for generosity are Right cabinet and trend. All models include xed
country eects. Several statistics from second stage models are reported in tables 2 and 4.
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Dependent variable: ln(Generosity Index)
OLS OLS-FIX IV-1 IV-2 IV-3
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
ln(Wage Dispersion) {.4938*** {.3743*** {.6343*** {.7833*** {.5083*
(.0453) (.0601) (.1315) (.2005) (.2226)
Country Fixed Eects Y Y Y Y
Additionally included Emp.rate Barg. coord.
Tertiary Work. con.
F-value Fixed Country 75.8640
Sargan test p-value .2413 .0965 .1988
Cragg-Donald F-value 21.85 20.15 14.47
Hausman test p-value .0219 .0163 .3733
P-value composition .5633
P-value bargaining .2509
No. of cases 356 356 356 356 356
Note: The models also include the covariates Trend, Right cabinet, ln(GDP per capita), Open-
ness, Percent 65+, and Union Density. In IV-1-IV-3 instruments for wage inequality include
Bargaining coordination, Share of workers in conict, Share with tertiary education and the
Employment rate 16-64, when not additionally included in the equations.
OLS regression of the welfare generosity index as a benchmark. The models also include
the same covariates as in table 1; a full set of results is provided in the appendix. We
nd a negative signicant OLS elasticity of generosity with respect to wage dispersion of
-.49. Including country xed eects reduces the estimate to -.37, indicating that there
is a negative correlation between the permanent country specic components of welfare
generosity and wage inequality.
The subsequent models instrument for wage inequality. As in table 1, the instruments
for wage inequality include Bargaining coordination, Share of workers in conict, Share
with tertiary education and the Employment rate 16-64. IV-1 is our preferred specication
from table 1. We nd an elasticity of generosity with respect to wage inequality of -0.63.
Tests of overidentication and weakness of instruments are highly satisfactory and the
Hausman test clearly indicates endogeneity of wage inequality in the previous model. In
models IV 2 and IV 3 we check the robustness of our result, by adding the instruments
to the generosity equation in two blocks. In model IV 2, the share of tertiary and the
employment ratio (16-64) are included in the generosity equation. In this specication
we use as instruments the bargaining variables only. The skills distribution proxies do
not enter the generosity equation signicantly (see appendix table 12), and the eect
of wage dispersion is at least as strong when identifying the eects from the bargaining
variables only. We also note that the Cragg-Donald F-value is 20.15, implying again that
22Table 3: The Equality Magnifying Eect. Sub-samples
Dependent variable: ln(Generosity Index) Specication IV-1 from Table 2.
Group of countries excluded:
America Oceania BritIsl LargeEU SmallEU Nordic
Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
ln(Wage Dispersion) {.6353 {.5508 {.6308 {.4750 {.6664 {.6195
{4.04 {4.59 {4.80 {2.34 {5.35 {4.80
No. of cases 314 289 321 289 315 278
Note: The tables shows the coecient (t-value) of ln(wage dispersion) in IV-regressions of
ln(Generosity), with identical specication to that of model IV-1 in Table 3, after exclusion of
dierent sub-sets of countries. America=US,Canada; Oceania=Australia, New Zealand, Japan;
BritIsl=UK, Ireland; LargeEU=France, Germany, Italy; SmallEU=Austria, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Switzerland; Nordic=Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
our results from model IV 1 are not due to weak instruments. The next column provides
the results from the complementary experiment of introducing the bargaining variables
into the generosity equation, identifying wage dispersion from the skills-proxies only, with
similar results (even though the C-D-value is less good, it is still clearly satisfactory).
We have run a host of other specications. Most notably, similar results are obtained
when we add year dummies instead of a linear trend, the coecient for wage inequality
changed only marginally to -.540(.132) and a high Cragg/Donald F-value of 19.73 was
retained. A specication where wage dispersion enters directly, not in logarithmic form,
gives an estimated coecient of -.150(.042).
Equality magnied: Sub-samples
A typical worry when using international data sets is that the results could be driven in
particular by the outcomes of only one country or one set of countries. This worry may
arise out of two considerations. First, there is the standard problem of potential outliers.
We don't want the results simply to be driven by one or two observations. But when
we use instrumental variables methods, there is the added worry that the results could
be driven by peculiar patterns of change in the instruments. We thus check that our
instrument variable model produces similar results for sub-samples in our data. In this
way we eliminate the possibility that the all relevant action in the instruments comes from
changes in only one or two countries. Furthermore, comparing results from sub-samples
may reduce worries about heterogenous eects arising from dierent dimensions of the
instrument vector, worries that may arise since the instruments are likely to have changed
dierently across the full sample.
With the small sample sizes and limited scope for variation in the instruments, there
are clearly limits as to how we can cut the data in order to check for outliers. We have
chosen to exclude dierent sets of countries, geographically determined, in each of several
23sub-samples. In table 4 we show results from identical specication as IV-1 from table 5,
estimated on these sub-samples. The table shows that our key result does not depend on
the inclusion of any country or any of these groups of countries in our sample.
6.2 Estimating the Wage Equalizing Eect
The second key prediction of our model is that more generous welfare benets lead to
wage compression (Proposition 2). The second column of table 1 conrms this prediction
empirically. The elasticity of wage dispersion with respect to welfare generosity is -0.53.
This result is both statistically and economically signicant. We nd that increasing
bargaining coordination by one unit reduces wage dispersion by 2 percent, while increasing
the share of workers who are engaged in a conict by ten percent of wage earners, increases
wage dispersion by 1.5 percent. Higher tertiary attachment and lower employment ratio
among both reduce wage dispersion. We also note that there is a signicant positive
impact of GDP per capita, and a negative impact of openness.
Wage inequality is instrumented by the right government indicator and the trend
variable. Again we show some statistics from the second stage models in order to provide
an assessment of the quality of the instruments (full results are reported in appendix
table 13). The rst model of table 4 shows OLS results as a benchmark. The next model
includes country xed eects. In both models, we nd a negative coecient for wage
dispersion of between -.25 and -.3. Model IV 1 shows the preferred instrumental variable
model, including xed country eects. The estimated elasticity of wage inequality with
respect to welfare generosity is -.51.
The Cragg-Donald F-value of 48.11 is highly satisfactory, the Sargan test of overiden-
tication clearly indicates that the instruments do not belong in the main equation, and
the Hausman test indicates endogeneity of generosity in the previous xed-eects model.
In models IV2 we include right wing government in the regression, and nd that it has
no signicant independent inuence on wage inequality. In model IV3 we include year
dummies in order to allow for a fully exible time trend and to check how the model per-
forms when we identify generosity through changes in government only. The coecient
for generosity remains practically unaltered. Furthermore, Cragg-Donalds F-statistics are
satisfactory in both IV2 and IV3. This means that we do not have to rely on any of
the two instruments in order to obtain our main result. In particular, it is comforting
to note that the model performs well also when we do allow for a fully exible trend in
both equations. However, since the year dummies are not signicant in specication IV
3, specication IV 1 remains our preferred model. All in all we get strong support for our
second key prediction from the theoretical model.
24Table 4: Wage Inequality
Dep.var. ln(d9/d1)
OLS OLS-FIX IV 1 IV 2 IV 3
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Generosity {.2891*** {.2697*** {.5143*** {.5207*** {.5033**
(.0417) (.0388) (.0840) (.0854) (.1823)
Country Fixed Eects Y Y Y Y
Additionally included Right Year
government dummies
F-value ctry.x.e 93.70
p-value year dummies .9496
Sargan test p-value .6581
Cragg-Donald F-value 48.11 93.43 19.98
Hausman test p-value .0004 .0004 .0523
No. of cases 356 356 356 356 356
Note: The models also include the covariates Bargaining Coordination, Workers in Conict,
Tertiary, Employment percent 16-64, ln(GDP per capita), Openness, Population 65+. The
instruments for generosity in models IV1-IV3 include right cabinet and trend with the exception
of the included variable in each model. All equations include data source controls (see data
section for details).
Table 5: Wage Inequality
Dep.var. ln(d9/d1) Group of countries excluded:
America Oceania BritIsl LargeEU SmallEU Nordic
Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t Coef./t
Generosity {.4539 {.6212 {.4777 {.4247 {.5738 {.5429
{4.77 {6.16 {3.56 {4.97 {6.32 {6.32
No. of cases 314 289 321 289 315 278
Note: The table shows the coecient (t-value) of ln(Generosity) in IV-regressions of ln(Wage
Inequality), with identical specication to that of model IV-1 in Table 5, after exclusion of
dierent sub-sets of countries. America=US,Canada; Oceania=Australia, New Zealand, Japan;
BritIsl=UK, Ireland; LargeEU=France, Germany, Italy; SmallEU=Austria, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Switzerland; Nordic=Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
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Again, we may worry that this result arise from some outlier, or from instruments kicking
in only for a very few observations. We thus do the same exercise for the wage inequality
equation as we did for the generosity equation: We estimate the model excluding dierent
groups of countries. No country is included in all of the models. Table 6 shows the result
from this experiment. The table shows that our key result does not depend on the
inclusion of any country or any of these groups of countries in our sample.
Close tie in parliament
Since the identication of the wage inequality curve depends on one single substantial
instrument only, namely right government, we have undertaken a few further tests in
order to check the quality of this instrument. The idea is that comparing observations
where there is a close tie in the parliament, we compare situations where the assumption
that right versus left government can be treated as if it was an exogenous random event.
The results are reported in table 15 in the appendix where we provide three dierent
experiments.
In the rst two we constructed a "tie-variable" taking the value of one with a 50/50
setting in the parliament, and declining linearly towards zero at 0/100 and 100/0. The
rst two columns of table 15 show the results where our instrument is right government
weighted by the tie variable, and the next two columns show the results when we weight
each observation by the tie variable, using the specication from table 1. In both exper-
iments we nd even stronger eects of the right government variable in the generosity
equation, and an estimated equality multiplier of 1.49 and 1.28. The results indicate that
our instrument (right government) is even more likely to be valid than in the cases where
voters have given one of the blocks a strong support.
In the last experiment we replace our right government variable with the 5-year lead
of the same variable.13 In this 'placebo' experiment, the 5 year lead has no eect on
generosity (identication of the wage equation is only through the trend variable in that
case).
All in all, as a supplement to the specication tests presented in section 5.5, these
experiments strengthen the case for right government as a valid instrument.
6.3 Estimating the Equality Multiplier
We have shown how wage equality stimulates the generosity of welfare spending, and how
the generosity of welfare spending generates further wage compression. But a shift in one
of the two curves generates feed-back eects until system reaches a new equilibrium. The
13Note that since right government is an average of the last 5 years, the 5-year lead starts moving
already with a right wing government the next year.
26Table 6: The Equality Multiplier
3SLS FE 3SLS FE+Year
Generosity Inequality Generosity Inequality





Equality multiplier 1.5183 1.4285
E.M l.e. 1:p-value .0018 .0440
No. of cases 356 356
Summary statistics from the rst models of table 1. Number of countries: 18. Dependent vari-
ables: ln(Overall Generosity Index) and ln(Wage dispersion). Instruments for wage inequality
included in the IV specications are Bargaining coordination, Workers in conict, Share of pop.
with tertiary education and the employment pct(16-64). Instruments for generosity included in
the IV specications are Right cabinet and trend. Models are identical to the two rst columns
in table 1 and include xed country eects. p-value for one-sided test.
initial shift is then magnied by the multiplier. This section combines the two equations
of the 3SLS framework in order to provide an empirical estimate of the equality multiplier.
Table 6 shows the key coecients of this model, taken from table 1. Below the line we
show the calculated equality multiplier (see equation 4) from the two equations. In our
preferred model, the estimated equality multiplier is as large as 1.52, implying that any
exogenous change is magnied by 52 percent due to the cumulative impact of the feed
back eects. This eect is both statistically and economically signicant.
We re-estimated the model using only OECD gures of reported wage inequality from
every country.14 The number of observations was reduced to 331, but the results were
almost identical to those of the full sample. The equality multiplier is now estimated to
1.49. This shows that our results do not depend on the inclusion of additional data sources
for wage inequality.15 We also re-estimated the model using two dierent semi-logarithmic
specications as well as a linear-linear specication. The key coecients are reported in
appendix table 14. The estimated equality multipliers varies reasonably within the range
from 1.33 to 1.57. Hence, the gist of the results is robust to changes in functional form.
14Results (not shown) are available from the authors on request
15Note that this experiment not only changes the sample size, but also that the wage data are dierent
for countryyear observations that include data from several sources in the original data set. See appendix
table 3 for a description of wage data sources.
27Orders of magnitude
To illustrate the order of magnitude of the eects and the feedbacks, we discuss some
contra-factual experiments, using the 3SLS xed eects results of table 1. Keeping a
right wing government for ve years reduces the overall generosity index directly by 2.6
percent. A reduction of the overall generosity index by 2.6 percent would then increase
wage inequality by 1.4 percent, which again feeds back to welfare generosity. The equality
multiplier summarizes all the feedbacks, implying that the total eect of a right wing
government adds up to a reduction in overall generosity by 4 percent. The total eect
on wage inequality via decreased generosity is a 2.1 percent increase. These eects are
statistically signicant, but not very large in magnitude.
A drop in the coordination index by 4 levels, from full coordination to full decentral-
ization, increases wage inequality by 8.3 percent. Such an increase in wage inequality has
a direct negative eect on the demand for welfare generosity of 5.3 percent, which again
feeds back to wage inequality. The end result, taking the equality multiplier into account,
is an increase in wage inequality of 12.6 percent and a drop in welfare generosity by 8.1
percent.
Since the bargaining system has no direct eect on welfare generosity, this eect mimics
the eect of any exogenous change in wage inequality that would imply 8.3 percent higher
inequality. Examples of such changes could be skill biased technological change or changes
in the direction of more performance related pay within rms. Again the end result is
an increase in wage inequality of 12.6 percent and a drop in welfare generosity by 8.1
percent.
Rising GDP per capita by 10 percent has a direct eect on both generosity (+4.5
percent) and on wage inequality (+1.6 percent). However, because of the feedback eects,
the overall eects are a 5.3 percent increase in generosity and a 1.2 percent reduction in
wage inequality. The eect of openness is negative on both generosity and inequality, as
is the eect of union density. In both of these cases, the feedback eects thus tend to
cancel out the initial impacts, and thus dampen the nal eect on both outcomes. We also
note, for instance, that increased tertiary education increases the demand for the social
insurance, but only through its equalizing eect on wage dispersion. A similar observation
may be made with respect to the employment rate of the working age population, which
tends to give higher wage dispersion and thus reduced demand for social insurance.
Three worlds
How much of the dierences between the three worlds of welfare capitalism of Esping
Andersen (1990) can be explained by our model? The rst column of table 7 shows the
raw dierences in wage inequality and generosity between the three worlds, measured
as the percentage dierence from the (unweighted) 18-country de-trended averages. We
28Table 7: Three Worlds of Capitalism
Inequality and Generosity:
Percent dierences from 18-country mean
Raw detrended Reduced form 3SLS-FE
Wage Inequality .
Liberal 19.44 13.60 6.47
Conservative -0.15 -2.15 -8.19
Soc.Dem -19.29 -11.45 1.72
Span Lib-Soc.D 38.73 25.04 4.75
Generosity .
Liberal -19.96 -13.32 -4.93
Conservative -6.96 -9.62 -12.52
Soc.Dem 26.92 22.94 17.46
Span Lib-Soc.D -46.88 -36.26 -22.39
Note: Each entry shows the percentage deviation of the (unweighted) mean of the country xed
eects of each group of countries, relative to the overall mean. The rst column shows the
deviation of the average xed country eects from a model only including a trend, the second
column shows the deviation of the average xed country eects from the reduced form equations
underlying the table 1. The third column shows the deviation of the average xed country
eects from the 3sls specication of table 1. See data section for exact denition of each group
of countries (or World of Capitalism). The percentageage deviation is calculated as 100x(eb
-1), where b is the (unweighted) mean deviation of the estimated xed eect for each group.
Dependent variables; Wage inequality: ln(wage dispersion), Generosity: ln(Overall generosity
index).
nd, for instance, that the liberal countries have almost 20 percent higher wage inequality
than the 18-country average in our sample, and that the span between the liberal and
the social democratic countries adds up to more than 38 percent of the average wage
inequality. The liberal countries have 20 percent lower welfare generosity, and the span
between the liberal and the social democratic countries adds up to 47 percent of the
average welfare generosity score. We note that the conservative countries as a group are
relatively close to the OECD average in terms of both generosity and wage inequality.
The second column of table 8 shows the same type of aggregate country eects for
the reduced form model. Concerning wage inequality, we nd that when conditioning on
all the exogenous variables, the unexplained gap between liberal and social democratic
countries drops signicantly from 38 percent to 25 percent of the average value. Similarly,
the gap between liberal and social democratic countries in terms of generosity, drops from
47 to 36 percent.
The third column shows the aggregate remaining xed eects in each single endogenous
variable, when also conditioning on the other endogenous variable. The numbers are
29calculated as averages of the xed eects of the 3SLS model of table 7. The upper panel
shows the remaining unobserved dierences in wage inequality when we force welfare
generosity to be equal in every country, in addition to the other exogenous variables
in the model. We nd a span between the liberal countries and the social democratic
countries of 5 percent. The gap between these two worlds of capitalism in terms of wage
inequality is reduced to 1/6th of the raw gap, once controlling for all factors in our model.
The lower panel shows the remaining unobserved dierences in generosity when we
force wage inequality to be equal in every country, in addition to the other exogenous
variables in the model. We nd a span between the liberal countries and the social
democratic countries of 22 percent. The gap between the two worlds of capitalism in
terms of welfare generosity is less than one half of the raw gap, once controlling for all
factors in the model.
Our estimated mechanisms are thus able to pick up a signicant part of the dierences
in wage inequality and welfare generosity between the three worlds. In particular, it turns
out that the feed back eects between labor market institutions and welfare generosity
contribute considerably to the dierences between the three worlds of welfare capitalism.
6.4 Inequality at the top or at the bottom?
Most of the action in our theoretical model arises from the lower part of the wage distri-
bution. The Equality Magnifying eect is likely to be more aected by the bottom half
of the wage distribution than the top half since the majority of workers earn less than the
average pay. Compressing the wage dierentials below the mean should therefore induce
a more generous welfare spending than compressing the dierentials at the top.
The Wage Equalizing eect of welfare generosity arises from a strengthening of low paid
workers. Thus our arguments assert that employees at the top of the wage distribution
are largely insulated from changes in welfare generosity.16 Hence, one should expect that
higher welfare benets should leave inequality at the top unchanged, and have a similar
eect on inequality at the bottom as on overall inequality.The results reported in table 8
conrms this pattern empirically.
When using the bottom part of the wage distribution (i.e. the ratio of the median to
the rst decile) as our measure of wage inequality, we nd a clear equality magnifying
eect (although of a somewhat lower magnitude than the one we found using the ratio
between d9 and d1); and a clear wage equalizing eect of welfare generosity (of a similar
magnitude to the one we found using the ratio between d9 and d1). The estimated
equality multiplier is 1.31.
16This is partly because there is a larger gap between their income from work and their benets while
on government support, and partly because they have very good employment prospects and are less likely
to be dependent on government support.
30Table 8: Top and Bottom of the Wage Distribution
Bottom Top
Generosity Ineq. ln(d5d1) Generosity Ineq. ln(d9d5)







Equality multiplier 1.3055 1.0305
E.m l.e. 1:p-value .0013 .3535
No. of cases 355 355
Number of countries: 18. Dependent variables: ln(Overall Generosity Index) and ln(Wage
dispersion). Models include the covariates of table 1, including xed country eects. Instruments
for wage inequality included in the IV specications are Bargaining coordination, Workers in
conict, Share of pop. with tertiary education and the employment pct(16-64). Instruments
for generosity included in the IV specications are Right cabinet and trend. All models include
xed eects.
The picture becomes quite dierent, however, when we use the top of the wage distri-
bution (i.e. the ratio between the ninth decile and the median) as our measure of wage
inequality. The equality magnifying eect is now not signicantly dierent from zero; and
the wage equalizing eect is less than half of the estimated eect on the bottom of the
wage distribution. There is no multiplier eect when focussing on the top of the wage
distribution since wages at the top does not inuence welfare generosity.
Hence, interpreting the eect of exogenous changes in the wage distribution, it should
be kept in mind that the equality magnifying eect of compressing wage dierentials at
the bottom is signicant both economically and statistically, whereas there is no equality
magnifying eects of compressing wage dierentials at the top of the distribution. We
can therefore conclude that it is changes in the bottom part of the distribution that are
magnied through the equality multiplier|as our model predicts.
These results also speak to the current debate about the impact of institutions and
politics on inequality. In a challenging contribution Scheve and Stasavage (2008) ques-
tion the traditionally held beliefs about the impact of wage determination systems and
partisanship on the level of (wage)inequality across rich countries. Since, wage data are
available only from the 1970s and onwards, they use top income shares for the period
1916-2000 to construct an inequality measure, denoted Top10-1, which is highly corre-
lated with d9d1 measures of wage inequality, but not with d5d1|for the period with
observations from both. Since we nd that both the equality magnifying eect and the
wage equalizing eect basically work through the bottom part of the wage distribution
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Note: Scatter plot shows ln(Social Spending) (Historical Statistics of the US, see note under gure 2 for
details). The line shows predicted values of Social Spending, using model 2 in table 10, when setting
wage inequality equal to the 1960 level throughout
(d5d1) we are skeptical of the use of Top10-1 as a proxy for wage inequality that are likely
to be aected by the institutions of wage bargaining and the color of the government.
6.5 The United States 1945-2001
The US experience of the last century illustrates the mechanisms we have uncovered.
Figure 2 displayed a negative relationship over time between pre-tax wage inequality and
social spending, but a more formal analysis is needed in order to check if this relationship
provides a useful illustration of our model. We use data for 1945 to 2001, all drawn from
dierent sources than what is used in the previous analysis.17
Table 9 shows results from three dierent IV-specications. Most importantly, we
nd clear support for both the equality magnifying eect (higher wage dispersion reduces
welfare spending) and the wage equalizing eect (higher welfare sending reduces wage
dispersion).
17The reason is that we need observations from the time period 1945-1975 in addition to what we have
used so far. Using separate sources also add an element of robustness check to our analysis of course.
See notes under gures 2 and 3 and table 10 for details on the sources. Welfare generosity is represented
by social spending in percent of GDP. The data are taken from Historical Statistics of the US, and the
programs include social insurance, public aid, health and medical programs, veteran programs, housing
and other social welfare programs. The wage inequality data is the series of the d9-d1 ratio of male hourly
wages reported in Golden and Katz (2006). The series underlying gure 5 in Golden and Katz (2006) is
kindly provided by the authors. See note under gure 2 for details.
32Table 9: Generosity and Wage Inequality, United States 1945-2001
Generosity Wage Disp. Generosity Wage Disp. Generosity Wage Disp.
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
ln(Wage Dispersion) -1.4326** -1.5199** -1.3333**
(.4999) (.4962) (.4779)
ln(Social Spending) -.1998*** -.1290** -.1517***
(.0367) (.0429) (.0396)
Trend .0347*** .0022 .0356*** -.0004 .0337*** .0068**
(.0072) (.0025) (.0071) (.0023) (.0070) (.0024)
ln(Unempl.) .3006*** .0115 .2974*** .0038 .3042*** .0034
(.0442) (.0139) (.0459) (.0134) (.0444) (.0117)
Age 65+ (pct pop) -.0215 -.0254 -.0170
(.0668) (.0669) (.0656)
Right gov.[0,1] -.0555 -.0565 -.0544
(.0815) (.0809) (.0820)
Trend*Right gov. .0044 .0046 .0042
(.0026) (.0025) (.0025)
Truman -.0331 -.0444 -.0202
(.0802) (.0757) (.0806)
Eisenhower -.2371* -.2551* -.2165*
(.1090) (.1074) (.1051)
Kennedy/Johnson -.0980 -.1174 -.0759
(.1124) (.1089) (.1068)
Nixon/Ford -.0053 -.0264 .0186
(.1205) (.1175) (.1154)
Carter -.0110 -.0265 .0067
(.0993) (.0967) (.0955)
Reagan/Bush -.0946 -.1009* -.0874
(.0515) (.0514) (.0494)
Union Density -.0233*** -.0230*** -.0183***
(.0019) (.0019) (.0019)
Tertiary (pct pop) .0081 .0077 -.0016
(.0055) (.0050) (.0052)




Constant 2.8706*** 2.0594*** 3.0134*** 1.9714*** 2.7083** 2.0464***
(.8717) (.0946) (.8487) (.0792) (.8416) (.0709)
Hansen J-test p-value .1015 .0836 .0884 .0736 .0038 .0983
Cragg-Donald F-value 14.98 11.53 10.00 8.49 7.66 9.21
Equality multiplier 1.40 1.24 1.25
P-value E.mult l.e. 1 0.014 0.037 0.027
No. of cases 58 58 58
Dependent variables: ln(Social Spending) and ln(d9/d1). Instruments for wage inequality in-
cluded in the rst model are Union Density and Tertiary attainment, the next model adds a
trend after 1980, and in the last model ln(Real Federal Minimum Wage) is added. Instruments
for generosity included in the IV specications are Right cabinet (0,1; Share of last 5 years with
Republican President), trend*(Right cabinet)and dummies for Presidential period. Statistics
from 2SLS robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (except p-values for the equality
multiplier which is calculated from joint estimation (reg3 in stata, 3SLS). 33Details on the regressions
Since we now use data for actual social spending, we include log unemployment in the
equations in order to adjust social spending for the consequences of economic uctuations;
and we may thus interpret the remaining coecients as eects on welfare generosity. Since
we only have one time series and are unable to utilize the dierence in the development of
exogenous variables across countries, we have dropped most of the slow moving variables
from table 1, to be picked up by the trend variable. There is a strong underlying positive
trend in welfare generosity, most likely from GDP growth in combination with other
trends (replacing the trend variable by the log of GDP per capita in the rst generosity
equation yields a highly signicant coecient of 0.78 for ln(gdp) and introduces only
small changes in the other coecients; adding ln(gdp) to the model yields a negative
insignicant coecient).
We include right government, as before, and allow for an interaction between right
government and the trend variable. In addition, we include a dummy for each presidential
period. Even if these political variables are not individually signicant, they are strongly
jointly signicant (more on this below). We nd a negative impact of having a Republican
president, but the eect is dampened by a positive interaction18. In addition we nd
signicant dierences across presidential periods. The upward shift during the Nixon and
Ford administration, which seems quite contrary to Nixon's rhetoric, has been noted by
others (see eg. Trattner, 1989), and we nd a negative coecient most notably for the
Eisenhower and for the Reagan era. The elasticity of social spending with respect to wage
inequality is estimated to -1.43.
The rst inequality equation shows a signicant negative eect of union density, and
a negative elasticity of wage dispersion with respect to social spending of .2. The esti-
mated equality multiplier is 1.4. Several authors have argued that after 1980, skill-biased
technological change, computerization in particular, shifted the trend in demand for high
skilled workers19. The next model allows for such a shift in relative demand and repre-
sent the trend in wage inequality as a spline with dierent trends before and after 1980.
Wage inequality now display a positive trend only after 1980. The elasticity w.r.t. social
spending is reduced to -0.13, and the estimated equality multiplier in this model is 1.24.
A strong correlation between wage inequality and the minimum wage has been ob-
served by several authors, most notably DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996). In the last
two models of table 9, the log of the real federal minimum wage is included in the wage
18Browning (1986) discuss this pattern and attributes much of it to the interaction between the Pres-
idency and the Congress: Democratic presidents have initiated new programs, while the republican
presidents have not been able to cut the growth in spending from these programs due to resistance in the
Congress
19See however Katz and Goldin, 2008, who argue forcefully that SBTC has been a stable factor through-
out the whole of last century. This observation may be consistent with the fact that the added trend
looses explanatory power in the next specication.
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Note: Scatter plot shows actual Wage Inequality (ln(d9/d1) from Goldin and Katz, (2006) , see gure 2
for details). The line show the predicted value of Wage Inequality from model 2 of table 10, when keeping
social spending at 1960 level throughout.
equation. Two results stand out: First, the minimum wage has a signicant impact on
wage inequality, and second, the estimated eect of social spending is larger rather than
smaller after inclusion of the minimum wage. The estimated equality multiplier is 1.25 in
this case.
Note, however, that the Hansen J-test of the generosity equation now drops below
1 percent, clearly suggesting that the minimum wage is correlated with generosity, even
conditional on wage inequality. This may not be so surprising, since the minimum wage
is a policy instrument as well. The ideal strategy would be to instrument the minimum
wage as well, but this would be outside the scope of our paper. We thus conclude that
adding the minimum wage to the model changes the key results very little, and that
further analysis of the eects of the minimum wage is warranted 20.
(In)equality magnifying eect
Figure 3 shows the factual and a contra-factual development of public social spending for
the US. The dotted line shows the actual development of public social spending, whereas
the line illustrates the predicted value of log public spending according to the IV models
in the middle of table 9, for the hypothetical case where wage inequality is kept at its
1960 level throughout the whole post-war period. The gap between the dotted line and
the smooth line illustrates the eect of changes in wage inequality on the development of
social spending.
20A recent analysis is provided by Autor and Manning (2008) who use dierences in the minimum wage
across states over time to estimate the eect of the minimum wage on the US wage structure
35Note rst that there is a strong underlying positive trend towards higher social spend-
ing, most likely from an increased demand for social insurance among voters. Next, we
nd that the increase in wage inequality after 1975 and in particular from the 1980's
onwards have led to a considerable entrenchment in social spending. One interpretation
of this observation, which would be in accordance with our model, is that the increase in
wage inequality after 1980, partly due to technological change and partly due to changes
in unionism in the US, reduced the popular demand for social insurance, since it lead to
a drop in income for the median worker, relative to the overall trend. This made it easier
for Ronald Reagan to get closer to his preferred level of welfare generosity without loosing
voters, and vice versa for the Democrats.
Wage equalizing eect
Looking at the factual and contra-factual development of wage inequality displayed in
gure 4, we rst note that the model predicts the dip during the great compression
(actual values are linear interpolations between 1949 and 1959) even when keeping social
spending constant. However, we also note that the earliest level of wage inequality would
not have been so high, had welfare generosity been at the 1960 level. Furthermore, we
note that the increase in wage inequality, a result possibly of technological change after
1980, reduced union density and an increasing growth in college attainment over the whole
period, would have been even stronger, had welfare generosity stayed at the 1960 level.
A careful look also reveals that the surge in wage inequality during the 1980's was
even steeper as a result of the retrenchment in social spending, than what it otherwise
would have been. One interpretation of this observation, which would be in accordance
with our model, is that the underlying increase in wage inequality was kept in check as
a result of increased relative bargaining power of low wage groups from the expansion
of social insurance from the 1960's onwards. The retrenchment period of the 1980's on
however, reduced the relative bargaining power of low wage groups which allowed wage
inequality to surge even more than the underlying trend.
Interpreting the US case
As emphasized above one should exercise caution when interpreting the results from a
single time series, and we do not regard the evidence presented in this section as proper
casual evidence by itself for the mechanisms we propose. However, the results t nicely
with the results from the panel study across countries and thus provide additional em-
pirical support for our propositions. The picture that emerges from this country analysis
is one where there are strong underlying forces working in the direction of higher social
spending, in particular growth in GDP per capita, and at the same time there has been
underlying forces working in the direction of higher wage inequality, in particular recent
36technological changes and the decline in union power in the US. Because of the negative
feedbacks between these two variables, these underlying trends are partly kept in check
by each other.
7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated how economic and social equality can multiply due to the comple-
mentarity between wage determination and welfare spending. On the one hand a more
equal wage distribution fuels welfare generosity via political competition. This is the
equality magnifying eect. On the other hand a more generous welfare state fuels wage
equality further via its support to weak groups in the labor market. This is the wage
equalization eect. Together the two eects generate a cumulative process that adds up
to a sizable social multiplier. Using data on OECD countries over the period 1976-2002
we are able to identify an equality multiplier of more than 50 per cent. Using time series
data for the US, we have also shown that this cumulative process had a signicant impact
on the joint development of social spending and wage inequality in the United States over
the last half century.
The political economic equilibrium approach that we use incorporates the mutual
dependence between institutionalized labor markets and social welfare policies. While
social welfare spending depends on the wage dispersion in the labor market, it also feeds
back to the determination of this wage dispersion. The political economic equilibrium
outcome is a wage dispersion and a level of welfare spending that are consistent taking
the mutual feed-backs into account.
Using this political economic equilibrium in the empirical part of the paper we are
able to explain why countries cluster around dierent societal models: the Scandinavian
model, the Continental model, and the Anglo-Saxon model. Combined with country xed
eects and dierences in other explanatory factors, the equality multiplier helps explain
why almost equally rich countries dier so much in the economic and social equality
that they oer their citizens. We nd that it is complementarities between institutions|
not specic features of the welfare states themselves|that can account for the major
dierences between these three worlds of welfare capitalism.
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41A The political equilibrium of welfare spending
We derive rst the probability that the left wins: q = q (GL;GR). If GL = GR = Gm, the
expected vote shares are 1=2;1=2. With GL > GR voters with
v (GL;p)  v (GR;p) (A-1)
vote left. This means that voters in positions p below a threshold tend to vote left. Using
the constant elasticity of the utility function this threshold can implicitly be expressed
as:
k(gL;GR) 
U (GL)   U (GR)






 h(p) for GL 6= GR
(A-2)
where h(p) is strictly increasing in p as long as (8) holds.
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g = U(GL)   U(GR)) (A-5)
p = U ((1   GR) p)   U ((1   GL) p) (A-6)
The signs follow as for concave U() we have
U0(GL)
g=(GL   GR)
) < 1 <
U0 ((1   GL) p)
p=(GL   GR) p
(A-7)
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p=(GL   GR)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(A-11)
42Since h(p) is strictly increasing in p, we can express (A-2) as p < h 1(k(GL;GR)), implying
that the expected vote share for the left sL = 1   sR is
sL = (h
 1(k(GL;GR))) for GL 6= GR; sL = 1=2 otherwise (A-12)
where () is the cumulative density function for p.
To eliminate an articial kink in the vote shares at GL = GR we assume that the
actual vote shares are aected by random events (new political issues, performance on
TV, and popularity waves) after party proposals are determined, but before the election.
We have that the vote share for left is sL + ", and similarly for the right sR   ". The
stochastic error term " has a symmetric distribution around E" = 0.
The probability that left wins is
q = q (GL;GR) = Pr(sL + " > 1=2) = Pr
 
(h
 1(k(GL;GR))) + " > 1=2

(A-13)
which is continuous and dierentiable.
The rst order conditions for party proposals:
@q
@GL











Consider the case with linear party preferences vR =  Ag and vL = Bg, with A and B
positive. The expressions (A-14) and (A-15) then simplify to
@q
@GL












equations (A-16) and (A-17) imply that q  1   q, i.e. q  1=2.
43B Data sources and denitions
The data used in the core analysis of this paper is a panel of 356 observations from
18 OECD countries from 1976 to 2002. The variables we use are collected from dif-
ferent sources. Wage dispersion is measured by the ratio of the 9th to the 1st decile
of hourly gross wages. The data collected are mainly provided by the OECD. Most of
the OECD data are collected from the OECD Earnings database [http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/9/59/39606921.xls], supplemented by data from Employment Outlook, 1996,
table 3.1. (1979-1995), and 2007 Table H.(1995,2005) and from the OECD Society at a
Glance, Social Indicators, 2006 (data EQ2 { earnings dispersion of full time workers, 1990-
2003). Additional series are calculated on the European Community Household Survey-
ECHP (1994-2001). For the Nordic countries, we have collected additional series from
national data sets, obtained from the NOS-S project (see Asplund et al 2007), covering
the period from 1980-2001. In order to minimize measurement errors, an average over
these three sources is constructed for each countryxyear cell, so that each countryxyear
is one observation.
In the empirical analysis below, we always include a variable indicating the weight of
the dierent sources (OECD, ECHP, NOS-S) in the construction of each countryxyear-cell
average, as well as a separate trend variable for the ECHP data, in order to account for
potential heterogeneity in denitions etc. between the sources. In addition, an indicator
variable taking the value of 1 if wages are measured annually and an indicator variable
taking the value of 1 if wages are measured net of taxes are included in all regressions
involving wage dispersion. The table in gure 5 provides an overview of the years covered
from the dierent sources, and table 10 provides a description of the ratio between the
9th decile and the rst decile of pre-tax wages of the OECD countries from 1975 to 2005.
Generosity of the welfare state is measured by the overall generosity index provided
in the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset, constructed and generously made
available for other researchers by Lyle Scruggs at the University of Connecticut. The
index captures the generosity of income support in the case of illness, of unemploy-
ment and of disability pensions (including old age) of each country year cell. Gen-
erosity is constructed using both the replacement ratio, coverage, entitlements and tim-
ing of dierent schemes, in addition to other features of the schemes. The construc-
tion of the index is described in Scruggs (2004, 2007). The data set is available at
http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm).
Figure 6 displays the trend in the overall generosity index for each country in our
sample, together with public social spending as reported by OECD.
The political variables used in our analysis are obtained from E. Huber et. al. (2004),
Comparative Welfare States Dataset and from Armingeon et. al. (2007) Comparative
Political Data Set. Right (left) seats are the percentage of seats in Parliament held by
44Table 10: Wage Inequality. D9/D1 Ratio, 1975-2005.
Country Dataset  1975-1979  1980-1984  1985-1989  1990-1994  1995-1999 2000-2004  2005 
Australia* OECD  2.64  2.88  2.83  2.83  2.94 3.08  3.12 
Austria* OECD    3.45  3.51  3.56   3.23  3.26 
  ECHP       2.41  2.14    
Belgium* OECD      2.41  2.28  1.96 1.97   
  ECHP       2.06  2.04   
Canada* OECD    4.02  4.45  4.21  3.56 3.65  3.74 
Chzechia OECD      2.40  2.74  2.84 2.99  3.10 
Denmark* OECD    2.17  2.18  2.16  2.47 2.58  2.64 
 NOS-S    1.98  2.03  2.05  2.09 2.13   
  ECHP       1.87  1.86   
Finland* OECD  2.65  2.49  2.50  2.39  2.36 2.43  2.42 
 NOS-S      2.74  2.71  2.54 2.66   
  ECHP       2.20  2.18   
France* OECD  3.35  3.18  3.19  3.21  3.07 2.98  2.91 
  ECHP       2.88  2.87   
Germany* OECD    2.88  2.86  2.78  2.93 3.07  3.26 
  ECHP       2.88    
Greece  OECD        1.80   
  ECHP       2.70  2.75    
Hungary OECD      2.84  3.70  4.13 4.37  4.46 
Iceland NOS-S      2.97  3.19  3.29      
Ireland* OECD      4.06  3.97 3.59  3.57 
  ECHP       2.99  2.68   
Italy* OECD  2.94  2.55  2.28  2.35  2.40    
  ECHP       2.05  2.02   
Japan* OECD  3.00  3.08  3.15  3.07  2.99 2.96  3.12 
Korea OECD    4.59  4.25  3.75  3.77 4.04  4.48 
Netherlands* OECD  2.57  2.47  2.55  2.60  2.83 2.91  2.91 
  ECHP       2.16  2.23    
New Zealand*  OECD    2.17  2.16  2.29  2.57 2.72  2.79 
Norway* OECD    2.06  2.16  1.98  1.94 2.06  2.21 
 NOS-S    2.11  2.10  2.06  2.01 2.03    
Poland OECD    2.59  2.65  3.03  3.49 4.05  4.31 
Portugal OECD      3.56  3.85   3.07   
  ECHP       3.09  2.98    
Spain  OECD       4.22  3.53  3.53 
  ECHP       3.13  3.02    
Sweden* OECD  2.13  2.01  2.09  2.11  2.23 2.31  2.33 
 NOS-S      1.81  1.74  1.82 1.94    
Switzerland* OECD        2.71  2.56 3.01  2.61 
United Kingdom*  OECD  2.94  3.09  3.30  3.39  3.46 3.52  3.62 
United States*  OECD  3.75  3.91  4.23  4.40  4.57 4.66  4.86 
           
OECD average  OECD  2.89  2.92  2.93  3.02  3.06 3.11  3.30 
 
Note: Five years averages of available data. Each cell does not necessarily represent data from each of
the ve years of the interval. (*) indicates that a country is one of the 18 countries included in the main
analysis in this paper (due to availability of the welfare generosity score). OECD average is an average
of the gures obtained from OECD sources.





Outlook  96  
Socity at a 
Glance 06  ECHP  NOS-S 
Australia  76-95, 97-03          
Austria   80,87-94    95-01   
Belgium 85-93    99-03 95-01   
Canada 81,86,88,90-94,  97-03         
Denmark 80-90,  96-03      95-01  80-01 
Finland 80,83,86-03  77    96-01 83,87,89,91,93,95,97-03 
France 76-98,  00-03      95-01   
Germany 84-03      95,96   
Ireland  94, 97, 00, 03     95-01   
Italy   86-96  79-84    95-01   
Japan 75-03         
Netherlands 77-03      95-01   
New Zealand  82,84,86,88,90,92,94-03         
Norway 97-03  80,83,87,91     80,83,87,91,95,97,00,03 
Portugal   85,89,91-93  01-03  95-01   
Spain 95,02      95-01   
Sweden 75,78,80-03        86-02 
Switzerland 96,98,00,02    91-03     
United 
Kingdom 76-03         
United States  76-03             
* OECD Earnings Database figures have been supplemented with data from Employment Outlook 2007 for 1995 
when missing. NOS-S are figures reported by Asplund et al (2008).  
 
right (left) parties taken from Huber et al 1976-2000 and supplemented by data from
Armingeon et al for 2001-2003. Right (left) government is the ve year average of an
(present and lagged) indicator variable taking the value of one if the right (left) parties
has a majority in government (g.t. 50 percent), constructed from the variable govright
(left) of Armingeon et al (2007) (dened as right (left)-wing parties in percentage of
total cabinet posts, weighted by days). Population, the employment rate of the 16-64
population as well as the share of elderly in the population are taken from Armingeon et
al (2007).
Bargaining indicators: Union density and bargaining coordination from 1976-2000 are
obtained from: Golden, Miriam; Peter Lange; and Michael Wallerstein. 2006. "Union
Centralization among Advanced Industrial Societies: An Empirical Study." Dataset from
http://www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/, version dated June 16, 2006, now available at
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/golden/faces/study/StudyPage.jsp?studyId=636&tab=les.
Union density is dened as net density (see Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000); 2001 and 2002 values
are set at 2000 level. Figures for Ireland, New Zealand, and Portugal from OECD Employment
Outlook 2004 table 3.3 (linearized decennial values) Coordination in bargaining is dened as the
ten year average of (present and lagged) bargaining level 2 from Golden et al (2006). Bargaining
level 2 is the level at which wages are determined, coded as follows:
1 = plant-level wage-setting
2 = industry-level wage-setting without sanctions
3 = industry-level wage-setting with sanctions
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Note: Source; Overall Generosity Index: The Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset by Lyle Scruggs,
University of Connecticut. Public Social Spending: OECD Social Expenditure Database.
4 = central wage-setting without sanctions
5 = central wage-setting with sanctions
2001-2002 values of bargaining level 2 are set at 2000 values. Figures for Ireland, New
Zealand and Portugal from OECD Employment Outlook 2007 table 3.5 Centralisation index.
Openness is dened as 100x(export+import)/2gdp (openk/2) from Penn World Tables, ver-
sion 6.2 (see Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, 2006). gdp per capita (USD,
PPP-adjusted) is taken from OECD Factbook 2006: Economic, Environmental and Social Statis-
tics. The percent of population with tertiary education from 1990-2003 is taken from OECD
Education at a Glance, various years (linearised when missing). From 1976-1989 data is imputed
using linearised values of ve years gures reported in Delafuente and Domenech (2002).
The following country classication, which is based on Esbing-Andersen's (1990) decommod-
ication index with some modications (see eg. Scruggs, 2007), is used illustratively throughout:
Liberal countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States.
Conservative countries: Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Switzer-
land.
Social Democratic countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden.
Sources for the US-analysis 1945-2001: Social Transfers 1945-1959, Historical Statistics of
the United States, Millennial edition (includes Social insurance, public aid, health and medial
programs, veterans programs, housing and other social welfare programs, tables Bf189-195/gdp
table Ca1); 1960-2001 from the OECD Lindert-Allard Data Set (2009). d9d1 from Goldin
and Katz (2007) Figure 5: 1945-1960 Census data (interpolation for 45-48 (from 1939), 50-
4758, and 60-62. CPS-March data from 1963. Unemployment: 1940 Historical Statistics of the
United States, Millennial edition, BA352. 1941 Interpolation. 1942-1969 Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Annual household data, employment data statistics. 1970 - 2001 Source: OECD
(2007), OECD Main Economic Indicators, April, Paris. Table A. Share of Population 65 +
: Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial edition, Table Aa139. Right Govern-
ment: 5 year average of an (present and lagged) indicator variable for a Republican Presi-
dent. Source: Armingeon et al (2007). Union density: 1940-1950 from Historical Statistics
of the US Millenial ed. Series Ba4791. College attainment: 4 years or more of college: US
Census http://www.census.gov/population/ www/socdemo/educ-attn.html, Linear interpola-
tion 41-49, 51-59, 61, 63, 65, 94. Real Federal Minimum Wage: 1940-59 USGovinfo, cpi adj.
http://usgovinfo.about.com/ library/blminwage.htm. 1960-2001 OECD Stat.: Real hourly min-
imum wage.
B.1 Negative Correlation between Inequality and Generosity
Figure 1 in the introduction shows that countries with high wage inequality tend to have lower
welfare generosity scores. Here we check the robustness of this negative association, rst by using
various measures of both inequality and generosity and secondly by calculating the correlation
between the residuals of the two variables in a simple regression framework.
In gures 7 and 8 we ensure ourselves that the negative association is not simply due to
the particular measures we have chosen to represent inequality and generosity. In gure 7 we
measure the overall generosity index on the y-axis of each gure, while we vary the inequality
measure on the x-axis.
The rst panel shows the log of the d9 d1 ratio. The next panel displays d9d1 directly. The
next two panels show more detailed measures of wage dispersion, utilizing dierent dimensions of
the data calculated from quantile regressions. These observations constitute a panel of estimates
from separate micro data sets for each country-year of 11 European countries (see note to the
gure for details). The rst; within group wage inequality, shows the interquartile range between
d9 and d1 of conditional wages for men with tertiary education, within the same age group
working in private manufacturing (see note to the gure for details). The second shows between
group wage inequality; measured as the wage premium associated with tertiary education in
median Mincer regressions.
The last two panels show measures of household income rather than individual wages. The
rst shows the gini coecient of gross household income from Deininger and Squire (1996) while
the last panel shows d9d1 ratio of disposable household income calculated from the Luxembourg
Income Study.
Figure 8 plots our preferred measure of wage inequality against dierent measures of welfare
generosity and public welfare spending. Again we nd a consistent negative pattern between
welfare generosity and wage dispersion. Simple regression analyses (not shown), including year
dummies, conrm that the downward slope displayed in all panels of gures 3 and 4 display
statistically signicant downward patterns.
Countries with high wage inequality tend to have lower welfare generosity scores as the gures
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2 3 4 5 6
d9d1 Household Disp. Income
Source; Y-axis: Overall Generosity Index from The Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset by Lyle
Scruggs, University of Connecticut. X-axis: Panels a and b use wage inequality measures from our data,
mainly from OECD sources, see data section for details. Panel c and d display wage inequality measures
calculated from quantile regressions from a panel of 11 European countries (Aut, Bel, Den, Fin, Fra, Ger,
Ita, Nor, Swe, UK; N=79, years 19080-2002) by the EDWIN project (see www.etla./edwin). Panel c
displays the d9-d1 interquantile range of the conditional wage distribution, calculated for individuals with
completed tertiary education, of the same age, gender, and within private sector manufacturing. Panel d
displays the wage premium associated with tertiary education from q5 of the same quantile regression.
Panel e displays the gini coecient of gross household income from the Deininger and Squire (1996) data.
Contries included are Aus, Aut, Bel, Can, Den, Fin, Fra, Ger, Ita, Jap, NZ, Nor, Swe, UK, US; N=
93, years 1976-1992. Panel f shows the d9d1 ratio of disposable household income from the Luxembourg
Income Study, countries included are Aus, Aut, Bel, Can, Den, Fin, Fra, Ger, Ire, Ita, Net, Nor, Swe,
UK, US; N= 93, years 1976-1992.
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Pension Generosity Index
 
Source; Y-axis: Wage Dispersion from our own data set, mainly from OECD sources, see data section
for details. X-axis: Panel a use our preferred measure of generosity: ln(Overall Generosity Score) from
the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset, see data section for details. Panels b, c, and d show
the underlying indexes which add up to the overall generosity score: Panel b shows the generosity
of unemployment benets, panel c the generosity of sickness benets, and panel d the generosity of
disability and old age pensions. The two last panels show spending data from OECD sources (OECD
Social Spending Database), panel e gives the sum of public social spending [Countries included are Aus,
Aut, Bel, Can, Den, Fin, Fra, Ger, Ire, Ita, Jap, Net, NZ, Nor, Por, Spa, Swe, UK, US; N=365, years
1970-2003] and panel f shows the sum of social transfers [Contries included are Aus, Aut, Bel, Can, Den,
Fin, Fra, Ger, Ire, Ita, Jap, Net, NZ, Nor, Swe, UK, US; N=79, years 1980-2002].
50Table 11: Wage Inequality and Generosity
Descriptive regressions
SUR1 SUR2 SUR3
Generosity Inequality Generosity Inequality Generosity Inequality
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Trend {.011* .006 {.012** .009** {.033*** .005
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.003)
Trend squared {.001*** .000 {.001*** .000 {.000 .000*
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
log Population {.135*** .114*** {.096*** .104***
(.009) (.007) (.013) (.009)
log GDP per capita .400*** .186**
(.080) (.057)
Openness(pct GDP) .005*** .001
(.001) (.001)
Union Density .001 {.002**
(.001) (.001)
Age 65+(pct pop) .051*** {.043***
(.005) (.004)
Constant 3.302*** 1.067*** 4.632*** {.093 {.752 {1.221*
(.020) (.016) (.088) (.073) (.805) (.576)
R sq.inquality .044 .426 .647
R sq.generosity .295 .561 .726
No. of cases 356 356 356
Corr. residuals {.417 {.373 {.325
Chi-sq Breush-Pagan 61.9 49.4 37.6
Dependent variables:ln(Wage Dispersion) and ln(Generosity Index). Inequality equations also
include data source controls (see data section).
shows. In table 11 we report descriptive regressions of wage inequality and generosity, using
standard SUR-regressions on the pooled data set. Dependent variables are ln(Wage dispersion)
and ln(Overall Generosity Index). In the rst model, SUR1, we conrm a statistically signicant
negative correlation between the residuals of wage inequality and welfare generosity, in line with
the patterns observed in gures 1 and 2. The correlation coecient between the de-trended
residuals is -0.42 and highly signicant.
In model SUR2 we establish that the correlation is not just due to the fact that small
countries tend to have more generous welfare states and at the same time less wage inequality.
In model SUR3 we nd that the richer countries have more generous welfare states and tend
to have more inequality. Furthermore we nd that more open economies have more generous
welfare states, that higher union density is associated with more generous welfare states and
more compressed wage distributions, and that the proportion of the population over 65 is pos-
itively correlated with welfare generosity and negatively associated with wage inequality. The
correlation between the residuals of the two regressions remains negative and highly signicant.
C Some further robustness checks
Table 12 and 13 provide the full regression results of tables 2 and 4 in the main text. The rst
two models are OLS specications, the third model is the preferred IV-specication, used in the
second stage of our 3SLS models in table 1, and the last two models provides a check of the
validity of the instruments.
Table 15 reports the results from three dierent experiments involving the right government
variable as instrument. The two rst models weights the government variable up if there is a
close tie in the parliament, the last model uses the lead rather than the lag of the right wing
government variable. See the main text for details and interpretation.
51Table 12: Welfare Generosity
Dependent variable: ln(Generosity Index)
OLS OLS-FIX IV-1 IV-2 IV-3
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
ln(Wage Dispersion) {.4938*** {.3743*** {.6343*** {.7833*** {.5083*
(.0453) (.0601) (.1315) (.2005) (.2226)
Trend {.0219*** {.0226*** {.0196*** {.0171*** {.0213***
(.0027) (.0027) (.0030) (.0046) (.0033)
Right cabinet [0,1] {.0341* {.0382*** {.0285* {.0223 {.0366**
(.0170) (.0111) (.0121) (.0138) (.0128)
log GDP per capita .4248*** .4649*** .4452*** .4120*** .4498***
(.0503) (.0386) (.0400) (.0527) (.0403)
Openness (pct GDP) .0051*** {.0032** {.0037** {.0046** {.0031**
(.0005) (.0011) (.0011) (.0015) (.0012)
Age 65+ (pct pop) .0167*** .0132*** .0073 .0023 .0106*
(.0033) (.0039) (.0047) (.0068) (.0053)
Union Density .0003 {.0021* {.0024** {.0026** {.0015
(.0005) (.0008) (.0009) (.0010) (.0010)
Empl.pct 16-64 .0015
(.0015)








F-value xed ctry 75.8640
Sargan test p-value .2413 .0965 .1988
Cragg-Donald F-value 21.85 20.15 14.47
Hausman test p-value .0219 .0163 .3733
P-value composition .5633
P-value bargaining .2509
No. of cases 356 356 356 356 356
Note: The instruments for wage inequality include Bargaining coordination, Share of workers
in conict, Share with tertiary education and the Employment rate 16-64, when not included in
the equations.
Table 13: Wage Inequality
Dep.var. ln(d9/d1)
OLS OLS-FIX IV 1 IV 2 IV 3
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Generosity {.2891*** {.2697*** {.5143*** {.5207*** {.5033**
(.0417) (.0388) (.0840) (.0854) (.1823)
Bargaining Coord. {.0835*** {.0369*** {.0276** {.0294** {.0272**
(.0073) (.0087) (.0094) (.0103) (.0099)
Workers in con.(pct) {.0003 .0014** .0009* .0009 .0007
(.0007) (.0004) (.0005) (.0005) (.0007)
Tertiary (pct pop) .0024 {.0001 {.0009 {.0010 {.0001
(.0013) (.0014) (.0014) (.0015) (.0017)
Empl.pct 16-64 {.0007 .0028*** .0032*** .0032*** .0043***
(.0009) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
log GDP per capita .0145 .0959*** .1414*** .1416*** .0719
(.0286) (.0227) (.0273) (.0274) (.1200)
Openness (pct GDP) {.0003 {.0021* {.0043*** {.0043*** {.0047***
(.0005) (.0008) (.0011) (.0011) (.0011)
Age 65+ (pct pop) {.0138*** {.0107*** {.0095** {.0090** {.0110**
(.0033) (.0031) (.0033) (.0035) (.0041)
Union Density {.0023*** {.0008 {.0007 {.0006 {.0005







p-value year dummies .9496
Sargan test p-value .6581
Cragg-Donald F-value 48.11 93.43 19.98
Hausman test p-value .0004 .0004 .0523
No. of cases 356 356 356 356 356
Note: The instruments for generosity in models IV1-IV3 include right cabinet and trend with
the exception of the included variable in each model. All equations include data source controls
(see data section for details).
52Table 14: E-multiplier: Dierent specications
3SLS FE 3SLS FE 3SLS FE
G-Index ln(W-disp.) ln(G-index) W-Dispersion G-Index W-Dispersion
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
ln(W-disp.) {11.932***
(3.160)
Trend {.560*** {.019*** {.549***
(.073) (.003) (.078)
Right cabinet [0,1] {.798*** {.026** {.793***
(.238) (.008) (.236)
log GDP per cap. 11.755*** .161*** .448*** .577*** 11.829*** .558***
(.972) (.022) (.039) (.063) (.985) (.070)
Openness(pct) {.101*** {.005*** {.005*** {.019*** {.116*** {.021***
(.028) (.001) (.001) (.003) (.030) (.003)
Share 65+ pct .204 {.010*** .007 {.028** .215 {.034***
(.115) (.003) (.005) (.009) (.119) (.009)
Union Density {.054* {.001 {.002* {.000 {.041* .000





Barg. Coord. {.025*** {.065** {.077***
(.007) (.020) (.022)
Conict (pct) .002*** .003*** .004**
(.000) (.001) (.001)
Tertiary (pct pop) {.002* {.003 {.003
(.001) (.003) (.003)




Constant {85.773*** .302 {.845 4.038*** {88.893*** .091
(13.101) (.176) (.526) (.603) (13.302) (.547)
Equality multiplier 1.332 1.573 1.345
E.m l.t.1:p-value .005 .003 .009
No. of cases 356 356 356
Number of countries: 18. Instruments for wage inequality included in the IV specications are
Bargaining coordination, Workers in conict, Share of pop. with tertiary education and the
employment pct(16-64). Instruments for generosity included in the IV specications are Right
cabinet and trend. See tables 2 and 4. All models include xed country eects.
Table 15: Robustness checks - 3SLS
Right-tied Weighted Right-lead
Generosity Inequality Generosity Inequality Generosity Inequality
Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se Coef./se
Inequality {.6315*** {.4346* {.7550***
(.1247) (.1869) (.1114)








Generosity {.5234*** {.5024*** {.4359***
(.0730) (.0696) (.0853)
Barg. Coordination {.0204** {.0218** {.0302***
(.0066) (.0074) (.0069)
Conict(pct) .0015*** .0008 .0015***
(.0004) (.0005) (.0003)
Tertiary (pct pop) {.0020* {.0004 {.0017
(.0010) (.0012) (.0010)
Empl.pct. 16-64 .0024*** .0034*** .0026***
(.0006) (.0008) (.0006)
Constant {.7955 1.4359*** {1.3337* 1.3974*** {.4380 1.3534***
(.5187) (.1896) (.6175) (.1869) (.4874) (.2028)
Equality multiplier 1.4936 1.2793 1.4905
E.m l.t. 1:p-value .0018 .0389 .0016
No. of cases 356 337 307
Number of countries: 18. Dependent variables: ln(Overall Generosity Index) and ln(Wage
dispersion). Specications as in table 7, only endogenous variables and instruments displayed.
In the rst model Right Government is weighted by the Tie-variable. In the second model, the
full model is weighted by the Tie-variable. In the third model, Right government is replaced by
it's 5 year lead.
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